The exports riddle
- India's merchandise exports sector appears to be on steroids, defying even the logic of an economic slowdown.
- At a little over $8 trillion, global exports in the first half of 2011 grew by 22 per cent
- India's exports of merchandise goods, estimated at $153 billion in the same period, grew by a staggering 44 per cent.
- India's exports gained fresh momentum during the third quarter of 2011, when the growth rate jumped to 54 per cent, proving wrong even the government's forecasts of an exports slowdown from August onwards.
- Economists are also at pains to explain the apparent disconnect between a tepid industrial growth rate witnessed during this period and the robustness of its merchandise exports.
- Industrial growth during the first five months of the current financial year is down to 5.6 per cent, from 8.7 per cent in the same period in 2010-11.
- So, what is fuelling India's exports growth?
- The Indian rupee depreciated by around ten per cent in the last few weeks.
- This might somewhat help exports remain buoyant in the months to come, but it does not explain the boom in the last nine months,
- Information trickling out from Udyog Bhavan also suggests that the exports boom in the last nine months has been largely driven by two sectors — engineering goods and petroleum products
- the emergence of the two top foreign exchange-earning categories in India's exports basket is not a sudden development.
- engineering exports recorded a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 26 per cent, more than double the CAGR of 12 per cent for manufactured goods
- Petroleum product exports saw an even higher CAGR, 29 per cent
- he growth in petroleum product exports is easily explained by the recent commissioning of new refining capacity and the steady rise in petroleum product prices.
- The puzzle, however, is with engineering exports
- possible that the rise in engineering goods exports is largely fuelled by small- and medium-sector engineering companies
- The absence of an official explanation of the export numbers has fuelled speculative theories about dubious methods being used by India Inc to show an artificially exaggerated performance on the exports front
- Reports suggest there has been a sharp rise in exports to countries better known as tax havens, which are then used as a convenient route for recycling back unaccounted wealth stashed away there through over-invoicing and other questionable means.
- The government has also not dispelled doubts about the robustness of trade data, which critics allege suffer from double-counting of exports through special economic zones.
- Addressing data infirmities is a long-term challenge and the government must not shy away from it
Sunday, October 30, 2011
The exports riddle
Arab spring
Summary of protests by country
| Country | Date started | Status of protests | Outcome | Death toll | Situation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 18 December 2010 | Revolution on 14 January 2011 Protests subdued since March 2011 | • Ousting of President Ben Ali[53] and Prime MinisterGhannouchi • Dissolution of the political police[54] | 223[57][58] | Revolution |
| | 28 December 2010 | Subdued since April 2011 | • Lifting of the 19-year-old state of emergency[59][60] | 8[61] | Major protests |
| | 12 January 2011 | Limited | • a 40% increase in wages.[62] | 17[63][64] | Protests and governmental changes |
| | 14 January 2011 | Ongoing | • King Abdullah II dismisses Prime Minister Rifai and his cabinet.[65] • Months later, Abdullah dismisses Prime MinisterBakhit and his cabinet after complaints of slow progress on promised reforms.[66] | 1[67][68] | Protests and governmental changes |
| | 17 January 2011 | Subdued since May 2011 | 1[69] | Protests | |
| | 17 January 2011 | Subdued since April 2011 | • President Bashir announces he will not seek another term in 2015.[70] | 1[71] | Protests |
| | 17 January 2011 | Ended May 2011 | • Economic concessions by SultanQaboos;[72][73][74][75] • Dismissal of ministers;[76][77] | 2–6[79][80][81] | Protests and governmental changes |
| | 21 January 2011 | Subdued since June 2011 | • Economic concessions by King Abdullah;[82][83] • Male-only municipal elections to be held 22 September 2011[84][85] | 2[86][87] | Protests |
| | 25 January 2011 | Revolution on 11 February 2011 Protests ongoing | • Ousting of President Mubarak and Prime MinistersNazif and Shafik;[88] • Assumption of power by the Armed Forces;[89] | 875[96] | Revolution |
| | 3 February 2011 | Ongoing | • Resignation of MPs from the ruling party[97] • On the 4 June, President Ali Abdullah Saleh is injured in an attack on his compound in the Yemeni capital Sana'a. Saleh has returned to Yemen on 23 September 2011.[98] | 1,436-1,782[100][101] | Sustained civil disorder and governmental changes |
| | 10 February 2011 | Subdued since August 2011 | • Prime Minister Maliki announces that he will not run for a 3rd term;[102] • Resignation of provincial governors and local authorities[103] | 35[104] | Major protests |
| | 14 February 2011 | Ongoing | • Economic concessions by King Hamad;[105] • Release of political prisoners;[106] | 36[108] | Sustained civil disorder and governmental changes |
| | 17 February 2011 | Gaddafi killed on 20 October 2011, Civil war ended with Libya's Liberation on 23 October 2011.[109][110][111] | • Overthrow of Gaddafi; Gaddafi killed by NTC forces after fall of Sirte. • Opposition forces seize control of all major Libyan cities, including the capital, Tripoli andBenghazi.[112][113][114] • Formation of the National Transitional Council[115][116] • UN-mandated NATO, Jordanian, Qatari, Swedish, and Emirati military intervention[117] • Replacement of the green Libyan flag with the pre-Gaddafi tricolour. | 25,000[118]–30,000[119] | Civil war |
| | 18 February 2011 | Subdued since 31 March 2011, resumed in September. [120] | • Resignation of Cabinet[121] | 0[122] | Protests and governmental changes |
| | 20 February 2011 | Subdued since July 2011 | • Political concessions by King Mohammed VI;[123] • Referendum on constitutional reforms; | 1[125] | Protests and governmental changes |
| Western Sahara | 26 February 2011 | Subdued since May 2011 | 0 | Protests | |
| | 15 March 2011 | Ongoing | • Release of some political prisoners;[126][127] • End of Emergency Law; • Dismissal of Provincial Governors;[128][129] | 3,045–4,300[135] | Sustained civil disorder and government changes |
| Countries[show] | 15 May 2011 | Ended 5 June 2011 | 30–40[136][137] | Major protests | |
| Total death toll: | 30,430–37,140+(International estimate, ongoing) | ||||
Kashmir: why AFSPA must go
The Hindu : Opinion / Editorial : Kashmir: why AFSPA must go
- More than 23 years after the bombing that signalled the beginning of the murderous insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, India's strategic establishment is demonstrating a curious unwillingness to grasp the fact that the war to restore peace has been won
- Ever since 2009, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has been advocating the withdrawal of the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act from parts of the State, as a first step towards an incremental rollback of the Army's presence in civilian-inhabited areas — a source of everyday friction with civilians.
- Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram has backed the idea, and a report by three government interlocutors has endorsed it
- New Delhi has proved unwilling to act, in part because of bitter resistance by the Indian Army
- Three spurious arguments are being used to justify the status quo.
- First, the Army contends that the situation across the Line of Control needs a robust military presence.
- But Mr. Abdullah isn't proposing removing a single soldier. His proposals would only lift AFSPA from two areas where the Army in any case has no security responsibilities. If things went well, troops would be freed up for deployment along the LoC, leaving the State and central police forces to deal with the degraded insurgency
- Secondly, it is claimed that without AFSPA, the Army will not be able to stage counter-terrorism operations in an emergency.
- Proponents of this argument forget that AFSPA did not have to be imposed to allow the Army to assist in the defence of Parliament House when it came under terrorist attack in 2001 — and that the Army staged many successful counter-terrorism operations in Jammu province before AFSPA was imposed there in 2001
- Finally, some argue that the AFSPA-free enclaves will be magnets for terrorists.
- This, too, makes little sense, since the Army is not present in the enclaves anyway — and it is improbable that terrorists have not established themselves there for fear of a mere law.